Technology’s Unlikely Application of the Art of War by Tan, Andre T.
  
CHINESE STUDIES PROGRAM LECTURE SERIES    © Ateneo de Manila University 
No. 4,  2017: 89–104                                                                 http://journals.ateneo.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
BOOK REVIEW 
 
 
Technology’s  
Unlikely Application  
of the Art of War 
ANDRE T. TAN 
 
ABSTRACT  
The Art of War has become one of the most popular and 
influential texts of Chinese literature; it has found use beyond 
the military and strategic purposes similar to how the West has 
found use for it in business. What’s surprising, however, is that 
one can observe that technology itself was able to apply the Art 
of War in how it has become such a pervading force of 
everyday life today, with most of humankind today essentially 
relying on technology. This paper first tackles a number of 
related questions; afterwards, each chapter of the Art of War 
will be examined and analyzed to decipher how technology 
itself “applied” (or could not apply) the knowledge in that 
chapter. 
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he Art of War has become one of the most popular and 
influential texts of Chinese literature; it has found use beyond 
the military and strategic purposes. The West has found use for it 
in business – no surprise, given as our day-to-day skirmishes can 
also be deemed as “war” in our own contexts. What’s surprising, 
however, is that one can observe that technology was able to apply 
the Art of War in how it has become one of the most important 
facets of human life today, with most of humankind today 
essentially relying on technology, one way, or another. Each 
chapter of the Art of War (more so the first half rather than the 
latter half) will be examined, and analyzed for how technology 
“applied” the knowledge in that chapter. 
Before proceeding, some preliminary questions must first be 
answered. 
What exactly is pertained to by saying, “technology?” The 
simplest definition that can be ascribed to would be “everything 
that isn’t found naturally in nature.” The simplest tools of humans 
in the prehistoric era, for example, can still be regarded as 
technology. In writing this paper1, however, technology is regarded 
as the whole of technology; from the aforementioned simple tools 
of prehistory, to the electric and the electronic tools of today. This 
is technology that has become an indispensable part of human life, 
albeit abstract and without sentience. 
 
 
1 As I am a Computer Science major, I am admittedly seeing through that lens. 
T
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What war would technology be waging? It’s no surprise that the 
Art of War can be applied outside of war; it may be surprising, 
however, to see that an inanimate object – an abstract notion, in 
fact – applying it. The war of technology would simply be the war 
to  be, to persist, and to stay. When someone invents something, it 
may not have literal life, like a living, breathing organism; yet it’s 
undeniable that it’s there. Only when it’s truly forgotten, is it truly 
dead. 
If technology were to have an enemy, it would simply be those 
that oppose technology. This will most likely be contextualized in 
the era of modernity, arguably where technology has begun to have 
harmful, abusive effects. Technology doesn’t exactly oppose them, 
however – no means are made by technology itself, to oppose 
them, after all. Technology doesn’t need to target and fight them, 
even if it could have – technology is  there; it just is. 
If technology really applied the Art of War, would it be the State, 
or the general? It’s more difficult to consider it the general; after all, 
technology is always wielded and created by someone else. It is not 
a subject (at the least, at this very moment) – technology does not 
choose how it is to be created; it does not design itself. All 
technology, at the end of the day, is man-made and not naturally 
found in nature. Even if some piece of technology can create or 
enhance itself, it was still affected into existence by someone else 
for some predetermined purpose. If technology were a general, 
then it must have been an agent with autonomy and decisive 
capability. Then does this mean that if or when artificial  
 
92   TAN | TECHNOLOGY’S UNLIKELY APPLICATION OF THE ART OF WAR  
 
 
 
 
CHINESE STUDIES PROGRAM LECTURE SERIES    © Ateneo de Manila University 
No. 4,  2017: 89–104                                                                 http://journals.ateneo.edu 
 
intelligence came to be – to the level of tales of science fiction – 
technology can be regarded as a general? What if one piece of 
technology manages to create something else on its own, for 
example? 
A general is still different from the State that he serves – the 
general can be the State (as he is a member of it, a part of, and a 
proponent of the State); but the State cannot be just the general. 
Similarly, if one gadget, one robot does achieve sentience, it’s still 
not connected to “technology” as a principle, as an idea, as a whole. 
If, by some stroke of circumstance an artificially intelligent 
machine does manage to connect to the rest of technology, then it 
just proves that there was a prevailing larger body, a larger idea of 
“technology as a whole.” So before this sentient thing, there indeed 
was a “State” of technology. 
So if technology is more of a State, then who are its generals? It’s 
easy to say, ‘anyone who uses it;’ as they are all responsible for 
helping technology win its war. But wouldn’t they be more 
members of the army, than of the generals? They aren’t exactly 
contributing to its growth and progress. Again, the technology in 
question is technology as a whole. If a State were applying the Art 
of War, it doesn’t mean that the State, as a whole, were applying 
the Art of War; it means that its generals are the ones who apply it 
– but as established, technology itself is not a general, as it is not a 
being of sentience. By extension, this means that it cannot employ 
generals; at least, not consciously. Technology doesn’t think. It is 
people who choose to ascribe to technology. 
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Technology is a State that, in it, applies the Art of War. It’s 
tempting to say that technology is both a State and a general, 
neither in the traditional sense; but it is more of a State than a 
general; and although the exact identities of its generals – if any – 
are hard to pinpoint, the elements of the Art of War are still easily 
observable in its development, and each chapter will be examined 
as to how it applies (or doesn’t apply) the Art of War. 
Chapter 1 tells of the importance of war; that it’s a matter of life 
or death2; and to comprehend it, there are actually only five factors 
to consider. Moral law/Moral influence3 (道) makes it possible for 
people to trust in their leader. Heaven/Weather (天) refers to night 
and day, hot and cold; it pertains to the factor of temporality in all 
that occur. Earth/Terrain (地) pertains to distances, the lay of the 
land, the ground; spatiality is the focus here. Command/The 
Commander (将) deals with the general’s traits, characteristics, and 
virtues. Method/doctrine deals with the organization and control 
of soldiers, the logistics of supplies, and the economics of the 
military. It boils down to the excellence of each of these elements, 
the excellence of the army, and the excellence of the balance 
between rewards and punishment4 to determine which of two sides 
in a war will be the victor. 
 
 
2 All ideas from the Art of War were taken per chapter; the exact references used are listed in 
the Bibliography. 
3 The former of the terms is from ctext; the latter, from Griffith. 
4 Very legalist! 
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The other side of the Art of War, however, would be the 
capacity to create the situations; one can actively control the 
balance. Confuse the enemy regarding one’s own status – when 
one is near or capable, appear otherwise. Use the enemy against 
himself – use his rashness or arrogance against himself; take 
advantage of anything he is unprepared for. This unpredictability 
(and the enforcing of these unpredictabilities!) is what will 
determine one’s success. 
Each of the five factors can be observed with technology. 
Moral influence can easily be found in the relationship of 
technology and its users. Seeing as how prevalent technology is in 
humans’ everyday lives, people seem to trust technology a lot, even 
if they do not understand everything that goes on within it. There 
is trust in technology. Today, currency can even be placed in a 
digital form, payments can be transacted online, and it’s even 
becoming a trend of how people’s lives and/or secrets are starting 
to be posted online. It’s hard to disregard technology as a State or 
some notion that people would ascribe to – humans have become 
so reliant on it, for better or worse. We like using technology. Thus 
technology has been able to use moral influence. 
Weather – the factor of time. Technology has slowly but surely 
progressed over time, and today it’s advancing even more quickly 
than before. Technology is artificial, technology is controlled by 
humans – its time will naturally be “in rhythm” with the timing of 
humankind. Simply put, it’s a given that Technology would have 
mastered the factor of time. 
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Terrain: what distances has technology traversed? The physical 
bits, pieces, and examples of technology have definitely travelled 
far and wide; especially with globalization. With this, of course, 
comes the abstract idea of technology: that of ideas, of technical 
knowledge, of expertise, that have, over time, been shared across 
the world. Technology – the luxury of it, the need for it, the 
reliance on it – has traversed all distances. 
Command: the traits of the commander themselves are just as 
important; technology is not a general, but it does appear to 
manifest positive traits. This ties to Moral Influence, which will not 
be possible if the Commander himself, is not respectable. 
Technology, for better or for worse, has contributed a lot to 
making people’s lives more comfortable, convenient, and 
conducive. Technology doesn’t will this, of course – but it’s hard 
not to see why people do trust in it. 
Doctrine is one thing technology doesn’t have. It is not a 
general; it is not a subject, not a living being. How then, could it 
have organized its “army?” Technology doesn’t organize itself. It’s 
not as if the development of all technology is managed by only one 
singular body. Its advancements and progress are advancements of 
science and technology, research and development, creation and 
invention, themselves. It is not controlled; it is a person’s natural 
phenomenon to be curious and to discover; and technology is 
driven by this curiosity. It doesn’t drive itself, however. 
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Meanwhile, humans’ reliance on technology has been cited 
many times; these are how technology can be seen to have created 
its own situations to its own advantage.5 What’s remarkable is that 
the magnificence of modern technology could not have been 
imagined in the days of old. Who would’ve guessed the advent of 
Facebook, of computers, of television, and of cellphones? Humans 
didn’t have the need to update a page to show off the highlights of 
their everyday lives. Meals were started with prayers, and not 
picture-taking. Technology developed very slowly, but very surely. 
Until today we are easily surprised by the developments of new 
gadgets and new features, even though we may claim to already 
have a grasp of what technology is capable of, that we have an idea 
of what “cutting-edge technology” really means. Somehow, 
technology still manages to advance in ways that humans initially 
can’t imagine; it catches them off guard in many different ways. 
The more human beings learn, the more they figure out how much 
they don’t know. The field of computer science, for example, is but 
one scenario of this; there’s always a craving for better, better, 
better – when people started talking of how Moore’s Law 6  is 
reaching its limit, people found, and technology advanced to deal 
in the area of quantum computing, redefining computers and even  
electronics forever. Simply put, technology advances, and  
 
 
5 Meant in the metaphoric sense. I do not wish to depart from the fact that technology 
doesn’t operate itself. 
6  Moore’s law essentially says that technology – more precisely, the development of 
computers – advances at an exponential rate; advancements “stack up” on one another, effectively 
quickening its development even more.  
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technology never sleeps; but it’s easy to forget this, and technology 
will always surprise that it’s still existent; that it’s still here, and that 
it’s improving. 
Chapter 2 can be summarized to say that war is to be quick. To 
paraphrase, there has been no clever operation that has been 
prolonged7. It’s not saying that war should be rash and impulsive; 
rather, the more drawn-out war is, the more draining it is; morale, 
funds, and supplies will naturally be depleted more and more over 
time. One way to counter this would be how good generals will 
also plunder the enemy; taking the enemy’s supplies and captives 
as their own. Why need to raze everything down, after all? Supplies 
are still supplies after all. In doing so, the general manages to 
restore depleted supplies. 
The war of technology is to remain relevant, to persist, and to 
exist. A question that comes up would be, was it won quickly and 
concisely? For technology8 that was successful in staying, people 
chose to use them – and people usually make this decision right 
after encountering technology for the first time. For some, 
technology may take a while to get used to. Since technology’s war 
is simply to be, one can say technology always accomplishes its end 
of the deal. As it’s still a State and not exactly an army, it doesn’t  
seem to have resources that can get depleted; but the principle of a  
 
 
7 Sun Tzu. (1963). The art of war (p. 73). (S. Griffith, Trans.). New York: Oxford University. 
8  Here I consider a lower level of technology, the individual gadgets – some have been 
remembered or are being remembered for now, while some have been forgotten. Simple example, 
the Walkman vs the iPhone or iPod. 
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war drawn out being more likely to be a loss than a victory is here 
– some technologies that are harder to pick up are much more 
frustrating to learn, aren’t they? And they become losses – because 
people don’t want to learn something too difficult. 
Good technology manages to take enough of what was pre-
existing to create or apply something new; that’s how it stays. The 
iPhone and iPad, for example, were easy enough to pick up because 
its functional was very intuitive; it goes back to the very basic 
notion of tapping or poking at something that a user would want 
selected. Simply put, it goes back down to the basics; that’s why 
Apple’s technology stays. Interesting, how it parallels  good 
generals being those who also know to get what they can out of 
what’s prevalent, and not just to start everything from scratch. 
To take it one level back up, technology as a whole can be 
regarded as successful in being “quick,”  in a similar way that 
technology was quite early on discovered by the Homo sapiens. 
Early humans realized the usefulness of  stone tools – just like that, 
technology was born. 
Chapter 3 builds up on the previous chapter; it can be 
summarized as saying, a hundred battles won is nothing compared 
to a win without a single battle.9 As it’s better to take a whole State 
or its people intact, instead of attacking their army per se, it is 
more viable to attack their strategy or their alliances. Never attack a 
city as it is too wasteful, meaning the war will not be quick or  
 
 
9 Sun Tzu, p. 77. 
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succinct. An important part of this chapter is that it introduces the 
possibility of retreating when it is impractical to remain in or 
pursue the offensive. It’s also a weakness if  generals don’t know 
their own army, the army doesn’t know its general, or either 
doesn’t know itself well enough. One of the most popular lines of 
the Art of War summarizes, that for victory, we must know not 
just the enemy but also ourselves. 
When technology reveals itself, it is never just something 
distinctly new on its own; it is always a product of shared 
knowledge, experiences, and expertise across all the different 
people who have contributed to technology. This can be regarded 
as how technology knows itself: technology will not become 
something entirely, purely new. As its knowledge is never baseless 
or from scratch (more so in the modern era), it will never be 
previously undefined. As was mentioned, if something was too 
unfamiliar – i.e. not drawing from these past knowledge or 
experiences – it will be more difficult for it to catch on. Here it can 
be observed how technology “attacks” our strategies – once again, 
it changed man’s daily rituals and rhythms. Technology “knows” 
us, especially those who may initially be enemies (i.e. those who are 
initially unaware of certain technologies), as it wraps around our 
life. 
A last point of the chapter, however: has technology retreated? 
It seems that it has; what with all the individual technologies that 
have been discontinued. All the technologies that exist today are  
the ones that have won the war; yet there were much, much more  
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which did not. And those that didn’t stay knew to “retreat” – 
technology didn’t advance where it’s not meant to advance. It 
stops, and advances instead what are meant to be advanced. 
The fourth chapter deals with dispositions – the disposition that 
springs from being more defensive than offensive. Victory may 
come from attacking, but indestructability comes from defending. 
A skillful commander who masters this can also master the enemy; 
to the point where the enemy is one who is already defeated. The 
disposition here is compared to that of “a hundred-weight 
balanced against a grain.”10 When going to attack, it can be like a 
spring, loaded with potential force.  
Technology “applies” this simply in how easy it is to take 
technology for granted, especially with the younger generations 
who’ve been using gadgets since their early years. It is so easy to 
forget that all connections one has to the electronic world didn’t 
even exist a century ago. Imagine a day where you do not have any 
technology at all – life would be very, very different. There’s a 
reason questions about being stuck on deserted islands are 
interesting – the idea of being separated from all technology has 
become a daunting thought for many. If a hacker was able to break 
into all electronics (thereby changing the war of technology, or 
wielding technology), then tech would’ve had quite the disposition, 
having become quite rooted in human life, and it’ll be devastating 
when it attacks. 
 
10 Sun Tzu, p. 88. 
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The last chapter that can relate technology to the Art of War 
would be the 12th chapter, using fire in war. Simply put, it’s very 
destructive – but of course, it can also, in turn, damage the one 
who threw fire. That’s where there’s a right time and a right place 
for using fire – it can’t be done in the attacker’s own territory, for 
example, as doing so will only raze one’s own lands. The valuable 
idea here is that fire can cause the enemy to panic; this just might 
be the true damage of fire. 
There have been multiple occasions where technology has 
rained fire on its users – a more literal take would be how it can 
cause havoc, like how a popular mobile phone  was said to explode. 
A more serious take would be how the analytics of Facebook and 
the rise of artificial intelligence have caused its users to question 
just how far technology has come, and until how far should it go. 
The Y2K bug is also a good example of how a simple programmer’s 
error caused much of the world’s infrastructures and computers to 
be prone to error. These are not “weapons” used by technology in 
its war – at least, not directly; as technology was after all 
strengthened after these problems emerged. It’s apparent, however, 
that this is not how Sun Tzu intended fire to have meant. 
The other chapters of the Art of War are not as applicable to 
technology as they are concerned with matters that are of no 
consequence to a “State” like technology. 
Chapters 5, 7, 8, and 10 wouldn’t apply, as technology doesn’t 
really concern itself with management. These revolved around how  
commanders would select people, how they manage these people, 
how they communicate with them, and how they react to 
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situations. But technology doesn’t share this subjectivity; it is more 
a State than a commander. Technology per se doesn’t control how 
its resources would be managed, either. There would be no need of 
a notion of obedience, as the people are the ones who choose to 
ascribe to or follow technology, so it, as a “State,” wouldn’t be able 
to enforce a balance between rewards and punishment, either. 
Chapters 9 and 11 also cannot be related as the subject of the 
matter is the whole of technology; the State of technology, not 
necessarily specific pieces or instances of technology. Technology 
wouldn’t transport itself; it’s already there, because technology as a 
whole progresses whenever someone makes a discovery and shares 
it with others. 
Lastly, chapter 13 wouldn’t work directly as well, as technology 
doesn’t necessarily need to be informed of knowledge from 
another force – it is a body of knowledge in itself, so to speak. 
The Art of War is very simple, logical, and fundamental – it’s 
often even mentioned as to how much of it is actually just common 
sense or knowledge that everyone will happen upon after thinking 
long and hard enough; but that is precisely the beauty of the Art of 
War: it has no presuppositions. 
Confucianism school of thought begins from the concept of 
filial piety (孝); a lack of belief in this notion will render its 
succeeding thoughts baseless and pointless. Confucianists are also 
pushed to believe that humans are easy to sway to disorder if there 
is no education, no structure to be laid down upon them. A 
Confucianism mindset can be observed to be pushed forth. 
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Daoism, right from the start, tells readers to believe in the Dao – 
that which cannot be named, fully understood, or comprehended; 
for the moment one claims to grasp it, it cedes being the Dao. 
There is worth in all being natural, and there is worth in moving as 
seemingly in a state of indifference. A Daoism mindset can be 
observed to be pushed forth. 
Legalism believes men are inherently disordered to begin with, 
so there must be a strict yet delicate balance of rewards and 
punishment, with usually more weight on the latter. There are evils 
to be avoided, and all distractions must be avoided; for the priority 
will always be not just the self, but also the State that is being 
served. A Legalist mindset is also observed to be pushed forth. 
The Art of War doesn’t start from a presupposition or a pre-
conceived mindset. It starts from observations of war, and this 
seems to be a much more universal topic to start from – where 
hasn’t there been conflict, after all? It becomes universal, and this is 
why it easily could have been applied to fields outside of war, and 
even outside of human fields, as observed in this paper.  
Even those who do not think of, or those who have not read the 
Art of War can be seen to apply it, and the whole of technology is  
surprisingly one of these instances. There may be more chapters 
that don’t relate to technology than chapters that do, but it can be 
attributed to the nature of the subject – rather, the object – being a 
State and not a general that applies the Art of War. For all other 
four factors, for example, technology can still be seen to have  
manifested elements of the Art of War in its development. This  
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opens a new perspective in regarding entities that exist in the 
abstract or ideological sense – because they, too, can be understood 
in the context of the Art of War. 
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